October 2026

6.4 Resources

The US demand for priority over Brazil's minerals (strongest documentary evidence):

  • First proposal: a draft "Joint Statement on Security and Economic Relations between the US and Brazil" with 21 items, handed over 16 Oct 2025 during Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira's Washington mission (meetings with USTR Greer and Rubio). Vieira declined to discuss it. The items:
    • "Brazil shall inform the United States of possible asset transfers before a sale in the mining/critical minerals sector and offer US companies the opportunity to participate in a fair bidding process before Brazilian regulatory approval is granted."
    • "Brazil commits to holding free and fair presidential elections in 2026 and will not arbitrarily detain, imprison or otherwise limit the participation of political dissidents."
    • Boeing purchases.
    • Free-speech and US-sanctions-compliance clauses.
  • Second proposal: a slimmer 9 Jan 2026 version (7 sectors, 14 items) dropped the domestic-politics clauses. Through Greer it asked Brazil to limit "investments by non-market actors and foreign entities of concern" in mining and refining, and to review the US$500m sale of Anglo American's nickel operations to MMG (China MinMetals).
  • Lula's response: "unacceptable… a country wanting priority over our mineral wealth"; "arquivo morto" (Rádio Itatiaia, 17 Sept 2026).
  • Sources: revealed by Estadão (Felipe Frazão, 17 Sept 2026). [V] Estadão; [V] Estadão/Lula; [V] Folha (Bergamo) quoting the election clause. The full 21-item list page was paywalled (only the header was fetched).

Serra Verde (Minaçu, Goiás), Brazil's only operating rare-earth mine:

  • DFC loan: US$465m, raised to US$565m in Dec 2025, announced Feb 2026 within Vance's critical-minerals bloc package. It includes a US option for a minority stake. DFC investment chief Conor Coleman told the FT the loan "had offtake controls ensuring [the metals] went to the United States and US-aligned parties", "tied to our financing". [V] g1; [V] Folha/FT
  • Offtake: on 20 Apr 2026 Serra Verde signed a 15-year, 100% Phase I offtake with a US-government-capitalised SPV, with price floors for Nd, Pr, Dy and Tb. USA Rare Earth agreed the same day to buy the company (about US$2.8bn).
  • Pentagon money: an 8-K (event of 21 Aug 2026) records US$750m of US government funding to the SPV, plus a US$500m bank facility commitment and at least US$300m of US government forward purchases over five years. USAR's release names the Department of War as the investor. v8's [R] is now [V]. [V] SEC 8-K; [V] Serra Verde release (Ex. 99.2)
  • Closing: USAR closed the acquisition on 3 Sept 2026 (US$300m cash plus 126.8m shares). [V-s] USAR
  • Goiás vs the federal government: Governor Caiado's team met Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau in Feb 2026 and signed a state-level MoU with the US in March. Federal minister Márcio Elias Rosa replied: "Brazil's subsoil belongs to the Union… and whoever establishes relations with other countries is the Union." [V] Valor International; [V] Agência Brasil

Brazil's legislative response: Lei 15.506 (16 Sept 2026) created the National Critical and Strategic Minerals Policy (PNMCE) and a coordinating council (CIMCE) at the Presidency. It aims to expand domestic processing, transformation and industrialisation, cites sovereignty and defence, and offers up to R$1bn a year in tax credits (2030–34). Whether it mandates local processing is not confirmed. [V-s] Planalto; MDIC

Resource base (USGS MCS 2026): world rare-earth reserves are above 75 Mt: China 44 Mt, Brazil 11 Mt (second, about 15%). USGS revised Brazil down from 21 Mt. Brazil supplies about 93% of world niobium output and is the 4th natural-graphite producer. [V-s] USGS REE; USGS graphite; MME guide

The Flávio camp's minerals offer:

  • CPAC Dallas, 28 Mar 2026: Flávio called Brazil "America's solution to break dependence on China for critical minerals, especially rare earths", citing the 70% figure for US imports from China. He also asked for international diplomatic pressure on Brazil's election. [V-s] Nexo

  • The "Prosperity Partnership" deck (re-labelled in v9):

    • Author: André Marinho (Novo candidate for Rio governor; son of Paulo Marinho, Flávio's Senate alternate). A 22-page English deck dated 19 Mar 2026, branded "Flávio Bolsonaro | 2026 Campaign".
    • Contents: six pillars, including licensing acceleration, US-backed demand and price stability, domestic processing, US capital, and a US-aligned "critical minerals club".
    • Marinho's account: he confirms authorship but calls it a "hypothetical exercise". He says it was not sent to the campaign or to any US official and that the campaign did not commission it.
    • Meetings: he met VP Vance in early April, a meeting brokered by RFK Jr., the father of his brother-in-law. He says they discussed organised crime. He also says he visited Rockbridge in Dallas in March to discuss a Brazilian arm, an idea dropped in May.

    [V] CNN Brasil (authorship and denial); [V-s] EM; Opera Mundi (original: Amado Mundo, not directly reachable)

  • Rockbridge Brazil LLC (new in v9):

    • Registration: incorporated in Wyoming on 12 May 2026. Organiser: Chris Applegate, described by the NYT and Folha as the Vance aide who manages donor relations and advises the RNC and Rockbridge. A Faria Lima consultancy helped; Cogency Global is the registered agent. Owners are undisclosed.
    • Pedro Sang: a "Technology Council" document names him as CEO of Rockbridge Brasil and says the council would help the Flávio campaign. Folha's six campaign sources say he produced monitoring reports and used an office at Flávio's São Paulo HQ.
    • Denials and filings: Sang denies being part of Rockbridge or having a campaign role and says the plan has been suspended since May. The PT and Missão have filed petitions with the TSE and STF. No evidence of money transfers has been published.

    [V-s] Folha, 26 Sept; Folha, 1 Oct; Intercept Brasil; [V] CNN Brasil (PT petition)

  • Eduardo offering minerals: not found. [U]

Oil: Ibama gave Petrobras an operating licence on 20 Oct 2025 for the exploratory well in block FZA-M-059 (175 km offshore, 500 km from the Amazon mouth; about 5 months; "does not authorise any production activity"), with 29 conditions. This was a Lula-government decision. [V] Valor; [V] g1; [V] O Globo

Regional pattern (pressure → aligned ruler → resource instrument), from primary or mainstream sources:

Country Pressure / political event Resource instrument Label
Venezuela US operation captures Maduro, 3 Jan 2026; Delcy Rodríguez is "interim" leader; Feb 2026 OFAC easing for oil majors [V-s, Reuters 401] 31 Aug 2026 (signed by Rubio and Hegseth): 100-year concessions for 17 fields (about 65bn bbl) to the private NABEP. The US Department of War's Office of Strategic Capital gets 35% of NABEP's parent, a board veto, and 20% of off-take at production cost. Caracas and PDVSA say 25 years (the 2026 law caps contracts at 25+15). NABEP is Barbados-based and headed by Alejandro Betancourt. [V-s] White House; Transparencia Venezuela; EncuadreVe
Argentina Trump, 14 Oct 2025: "If he loses, we are not going to be generous with Argentina" (US$20bn support) US–Argentina critical-minerals framework, 4–5 Feb 2026 [V-s] Guardian; State Dept
Colombia Trump-endorsed Abelardo de la Espriella wins, 21 Jun 2026 (49.66%); inaugurated 7 Aug Critical-minerals and civil-nuclear MoUs signed by Rubio in Barranquilla, 8 Sept 2026 [V-s] AP; State Dept
Brazil Tariffs (2025), Section 301 (2026), sanctions (lifted), 21 demands (refused), PCC/CV designation, Abin "critical" DFC loan, Pentagon-backed offtake, USAR takeover of Serra Verde, Goiás MoU; no federal minerals deal as above

Context: the US–Israel strikes on Iran began 28 Feb 2026 and Iranian state media confirmed Khamenei's death. [V-s] Reuters; NPR. Trump's reported remarks on Iranian oil and "20 tankers" are [R].