October 2026
Scorecard
| Decision | Position of named Christian-Zionist / religious-nationalist actors | Outcome | Evidence of causal influence | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jerusalem recognition (Dec 2017) and embassy move (May 2018) | For (CUFI/Hagee, Jeffress) | Done. Jeffress gave the opening prayer and Hagee the benediction | Strong. Trump himself: "we moved the capital of Israel to Jerusalem. That's for the evangelicals" (Oshkosh, 17 Aug 2020) | JTA, The Hill, AP, CNN [V-s] |
| Golan recognition (Mar 2019) | For | Done | Moderate. Trump grouped it with the embassy as something for the same audience ("don't forget that, we did the Golan Heights"). Netanyahu's election timing was also a factor | JTA, The Hill (above) [V-s] |
| Settlements "not per se inconsistent with international law" (Pompeo, 18 Nov 2019) | For | Done | Moderate. Pompeo framed it as law and policy ("agrees with President Reagan"). Separately, he said it is "possible" Trump was raised up like Queen Esther: "As a Christian, I certainly believe that's possible" (CBN, Mar 2019) | State/UN transcript, CBN [V-s] |
| Abraham Accords (2020) | Generally supportive | Done | Weak. Driven by Kushner, the Gulf states and arms sales (UAE F-35s); annexation was suspended as the price of the deal | report §2.5; [R] for the annexation-suspension detail |
| Lifting sanctions on violent settlers (Jan 2025) | For (settler movement; US allies) | Done. EO 14115 revoked; OFAC removed designations | Moderate. Day-one action matching the settler lobby; no documented lobbying record found | OFAC, Reuters [V-s] |
| Ambassador's settler outreach and red heifer visit (May 2025) | For | Done | Strong (personnel). The ambassador is a Christian-Zionist actor | report §2.6 [V] |
| E1 settlement (approved Aug 2025) | For | Not opposed by the US. Huckabee said the US doesn't oppose settlement development | Moderate | AP, MEE [V-s] |
| Iran strikes (22 June 2025) | For (Hagee urged Trump not to be "played" by Iran or by isolationists; a coalition of Christian leaders backed regime change) | Strikes done; no regime change; quick ceasefire | Weak to moderate. Politico framed the decision as a fight between MAGA restrainers and hawks; the evangelical voice was one input among Israel, the hawks and the nuclear file | Fox, JNS, Politico [V-s] |
| Formal West Bank annexation (Sept 2025 – 2026) | For (Smotrich/Ben-Gvir; US Christian-Zionist groups backing "sovereignty") | Blocked by Trump: "I will not allow Israel to annex the West Bank… It's not going to happen… It's time to stop now" (25 Sept 2025). The Knesset gave a preliminary nod (Oct 2025); Israel pursued de facto measures in 2026 | Evangelical preference LOST. Arab leaders and the Abraham Accords/Gaza deal outweighed it | Reuters, AP, CNN, Reuters Knesset, CNN 2026 [V-s] |
| Gaza ceasefire and Board of Peace (Oct 2025 – Jan 2026) | Mixed (hostage release welcomed; Hamas contact and Arab role opposed by hardliners) | Deal done via Kushner/Witkoff and Egypt, Qatar, Turkey; direct Hamas talks | Weak. Driven by deal-making and Gulf interests | report §2.5 [V-s] |
| ICC sanctions (Feb 2025 →) | For | Done | Moderate. The EO text cites Israel explicitly; overlaps with standing US hostility to the ICC (ASPA 2002) | report §2.8 [V] |
| Temple Mount status quo | Hegseth (2018): a rebuilt Temple is "possible" | No US policy change found. Netanyahu's office reaffirmed the status quo after Ben-Gvir's prayer | None found | report §§2.6–2.7 [V-s]; [U] for any US statement in 2025–26 |
Pattern: named Christian-Zionist actors win on symbolic and legal-status decisions that cost the US little: capitals, sovereignty recognitions, legal opinions, sanctions relief, ambassador conduct. They lose when their preference collides with material deal-making: annexation versus the Gulf states and the Abraham Accords, Gaza versus a hostage deal, and Iran, where the strikes were limited with no regime change. That fits the report's main thesis: prophecy sets the floor of US support, and capital and geopolitics set the ceiling.